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I. Background Briefing on "Social Europe"
A. THE "SOCIAL EUROPE" CONCEPT
In the United States almost all the important employment laws-from labor
union protection statutes to antidiscrimination doctrines to wage and hour protec-
tions-are federal laws. In the 1930s, the United States Congress concluded
that the United States Constitution's interstate commerce clause gave the federal
government carte blanche to regulate employment. 1 The legal fiction necessary
for this conclusion is that virtually any employment relationship in any one state
must somehow necessarily affect commerce in at least one other state. Under this
reasoning, employment is per se a federal issue.
Political scientists in the European Community (EC) think the same way-
although the Europeans have been able to work through this reasoning much faster
than the 150 years it took the United States Congress. In 1985 the EC Commission
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1. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-157 (1988). This statute, passed
in 1935, contains a lengthy justification linking employment to interstate commerce. Id. § 151.
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issued a White Paper,2 made law by the Council-ratified 1986 Single European
Act treaty,3 which created a "single market program" to take effect after 1992.
This program is converting the EC from what was essentially a customs union
into a quasi-federal body. But the EC shuns "federal" terminology; 4 instead, the
slogan for the new EC order is the creation of a post-1992 "single market for
goods and services."
Under the same logic by which employment in any one U.S. state necessarily
affects interstate commerce in the United States, employment in any one EC
Member State necessarily affects the EC's single market for goods and services.
After all, no such single market could exist without employees, and because
employees create goods and provide services, this new market will necessarily
affect employment within the EC.
The 1957 Treaty of Rome,5 as amended by the 1986 Single European Act,6
empowers the EC institutions to regulate employment issues (or social issues, as
employment concerns are called in Eurospeak). The amended Treaty of Rome
contains several provisions explicitly calling for social regulation.7
In the single market program's early years of the mid-1980s, the Brussels-based
EC concealed that it would ultimately pursue a social agenda.8 To ensure the
success of the 1992 single market program, Brussels first set out to win a broad
commitment to its plan by emphasizing the single market's least controversial
angles: efficient trade, economies of scale, and a 320-million consumer block.9
With the spotlight trained on commercial advantages, the European business
community, for one, fell in as an avid supporter of the 1992 movement-as did
even Britain, the Community's most skeptical member. 10 By the close of the 1980s
the Commission was able to acknowledge an "irreversible" commitment to the
single market, among business leaders and among Europeans generally.l"
2. Completing the Internal Market, White Paper from the Commission to the European Council,
COM(85)310 final.
3. Single European Act, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1.
4. See Donald C. Dowling, Jr., Worker Rights in the Post-1992 EC: What Social Europe Means
to U.S.-Based Multinational Employers, 11 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 564, 575 n.46 (1991), reprinted
as chapter 16 in EUROPEAN EcONOMIC COMMUNITY LAW (1992).
5. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11
[hereinafter EEC Treaty].
6. Single European Act, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1.
7. See EEC Treaty, supra note 5, arts. 117-28. Rarely, but occasionally, social issues in the
EC involve nonemployment-related issues. See, e.g., Dowling, supra note 4, at 588 n. 147 (citations
therein).
8. See Dowling, supra note 4, at 581-82.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 582.
11. Fifth Report of the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Concerning the
Implementation of the White Paper on the Completion of the Internal Market, COM(90)90 final
7 ("[i]rreversibility and anticipation have characterized [the EC's] work [toward a single market]
in recent months").
VOL. 27, NO. 1
EC EMPLOYMENT LAW AFTER MAASTRICHT 3
Workers' rights became a hot topic throughout Europe 12 in the 1990s because
Brussels was by then able to acknowledge openly that the drive toward "social
cohesion" in the EC "cannot be dissociated from" the single market program
itself.13 Thus, in a matter of just a few years "social Europe" had evolved
from a whispered rumor to one of Brussels' most important priorities.' 4 Yet not
surprisingly, the social Europe agenda proves relatively employer-restrictive by
U.S. standards. 15
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF "SOCIAL EUROPE" TO U.S. BUSINESS
In the United States (more so than elsewhere, including Europe) a vast gulf
exists between employment relations law and transactional business law. 16 Yet,
of course, those who run U.S. businesses remain acutely aware of the critical
role that employment costs play in their enterprises' overall profitability. Total
employment costs, including benefits, rival costs of materials as a manufacturing
business's chief expense and usually far outstrip taxes. (In a service industry,
payroll and benefits account for an even greater proportion of total costs.) Yet,
12. See, e.g., More Rightsfor the Workers, THE ECONOMIST, July 28, 1990, at 60 (Commission's
commitment to social Europe is "irrepressibl[e]"); Brother, We Just Missed the 1992 Balloon, THE
ECONOMIST, June 23, 1990, at 61 ("[u]nion leaders are particularly keen on the [EC] social charter").
13. Fifth Report of the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Concerning the
Implementation of the White Paper on the Completion of the Internal Market, COM(90)90 final
6. See id. 28, 34 ("[tlhe Social Dimension is Fundamental to the Internal Market").
14.
The [ECI internal market programme has led to an increasing volume of regulation being initiated at the community
level, and this tendency looks set to continue as integration proceeds. This has provoked fierce resistance in some
quarters, with opponents arguing that 'competition between rules' is a better principle than the imposition of
monolithic rules at the supranational level.
CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES MACROECONOMIC POLICY GROUP, EUROPEAN LABOUR
MARKETS: A LONG-RUN VIEW 3 (1990). On the "front burner" status of the EC social agenda in
1990, see, e.g., M. HOLMSTEDT, EMPLOYMENT POLICY (1991); Dowling, supra note 4, at 580-84,
590-94; Emil J. Kirchner, The Social Framework of the European Communities, in THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES ENCYCLOPEDIA AND DIRECTORY 1992, at 109 (1991). Brussels now views social policy
and economic and social cohesion as two of the six objectives of the Single European Act, supra note
3. Sixth Report of the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Concerning the
Implementation of the White Paper on the Completion of the Internal Market, COM(91)237 final
[hereinafter Sixth Report], at 1. The other four objectives are the single market, the environment,
research policy, and the strengthening of economic and monetary cooperation. Id.
15. "Americans are becoming increasingly nervous about the introduction of social legislation
in Europe, [because it] is counter to American practice, according to an official of the American
Pharmaceutical Association." Financially Sound, Socially Insecure, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 14, 1991,
at 70, 72. For a comparison of EC employment law and its U.S. counterparts, see Mazurak, Lessons
to Be Studied from the European Community, in A FORWARD LOOK AT EMPLOYMENT POLICIES: A
CENTENNIAL PROGRAM 111 (1991) (Univ. of Nebraska College of Law, eds.).
16. This author has written elsewhere on how a dangerous crack runs through the law practice
area of comparative employment law: International lawyers often do not focus on employment issues,
and employment lawyers are usually either ignorant of comparative law, or else do not work on the
international matters in which comparative employment law questions arise. See Donald C. Dowling,
Jr., Preparing for the Internationalization of U.S. Employment Law Practice, 43 LAB. L.J. 350
(1992).
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notwithstanding this fact of economic life, U.S. transactional business lawyers
rarely, if ever, concern themselves with employment issues. 17 Too often, U.S.
lawyers negotiating a foreign deal relegate employment issues to the local lawyers
to straighten out after closing.' 8
Not surprisingly, therefore, many foreign ventures of U.S. companies develop
serious labor problems that were foreseeable but were not confronted at the deal
stage.' 9 In the most extreme cases these labor problems can render a foreign
operation unprofitable.20 To avoid such a fate, any U.S.-based business interested
in starting or expanding a presence in the EC to take advantage of the post-1992
single market must account for-in advance and as a primary consideration-the
employment costs that EC employment laws and customs impose.21
U.S. businesses shifting direct operations abroad have traditionally targeted
Third World countries in order to take advantage of cheap labor. 22 In contrast,
U.S. businesses' motive for opening European operations is to gain access to
the wealthy 320 million-consumer European market. The wealth of Europe's
consumers, though, comes from Europe's employers. Northern European work-
ers earn higher per hour rates than their United States and Japanese counterparts,
17. Correspondingly, U.S. employment lawyers rarely if ever concern themselves with transac-
tional issues.
18. See Dowling, supra note 16.
19. See, e.g., id. and text accompanying notes 31, 45, 54 infra. Under one proposed directive,
see text accompanying notes 122-28 infra, the EC plans to apply worker consultation and participation
requirements to those companies employing 1,000 or more employees in more than one Member
State, with at least 100 employees in a second Member State. Any large U.S. corporation that ignored
this instrument at the deal stage could end up unknowingly assuming wide-ranging worker participation
and consultation obligations.
20. Probably every U.S.-based multinational company with extensive overseas operations has
horror stories about foreign labor law problems that it could have averted had it spotted the issues
up front. See, e.g., Dowling, supra note 16, at 355 (major U.S. entertainment conglomerate that
establishes large European operation makes compensation promises to hundreds of U.S. expatriate
employees and hundreds of local nationals, which company ultimately breaks when it learns details
of local benefits laws); id. at 360 (U.S. corporation discovers too late that Canadian subsidiary is
unionized; corporation had not even known union campaign was underfoot, due to corporation's
ignorance that Canadian law does not require elections).
Foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies can become unprofitable because of European labor costs.
In northern European Member States, hourly wage rates are usually higher than in the United States.
Benefit levels, too, are usually more beneficial for employees. See id. at 356 n.36, 357 n.46. Further,
white collar employees in Europe enjoy employer-provided benefits unheard of stateside, including
country club memberships. See id. at 360-61. Additionally, in Europe, laws governing terminations
are strict. European operations cannot hire assuming that the "employment-at-will" doctrine, which
still prevails in the United States, will be available to them. See id. at 356-57. As a result, a business
that turns a profit in the United States might not be able to make it in Europe under otherwise-similar
circumstances.
21. See generally id. at 356-58.
22. U.S. businesses' suspected goal of saving labor costs by moving employment operations to
a lower wage country is the chief U.S. controversy surrounding the North American Free Trade
Agreement. See, e.g., Jackie Calmes, Mexican Free-Trade Issue Is Putting Unusual Cross-Pressures
on Lawmakers of Both Parties, WALL ST. J., May 22, 1991, at A16.
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and they enjoy even more lavish benefits.23 Indeed, European companies are now
looking to produce overseas to reduce production costs. 24 For U.S. business
Europe therefore poses a conflict between two opposite motives for operating
abroad-cheaper labor versus market access.25 This conflict raises a key issue
that U.S.-based businesses operating in Europe must consider: How to control
employment, or social, costs when operating in the EC.
C. EC SOCIAL LAW BEFORE MAASTRICHT
The EC's social Europe agenda was originally one of the slow-moving compo-
nents of the EC single market program. However, the focus changed radically
in December 1991 at the Council meeting at Maastricht, the Netherlands, where
the Council jump-started the social Europe agenda with a surprisingly powerful
jolt. Regardless of the ultimate fate of the Maastricht treaty itself, the proposal
is a milestone in the history of social Europe.
To understand the Maastricht meeting's significance, a rundown on social
Europe history is in order.26 The code-based legal systems of continental Europe
have employment law traditions markedly more employer-restrictive than those
of the frontier-spirited, employment-at-will United States.27 Even common law
Britain, whose strong Labour Party has flirted with socialism for decades, imposes
23. See Foreign Labor Costs Grow Closer to U.S. Figures, 137 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 280 (July
1, 1991).
24. See, e.g., Terence Roth, German Firms Bemoan Production Costs, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29,
1992, at A6. Consider BMW's highly publicized 1992 decision to open an auto plant in South Carolina.
Is the United States becoming to northern Europe what Mexico is to the United States?
25. The most hotly debated aspect of the Free Trade Agreement Treaty negotiated by the United
States, Canada, and Mexico is the employment issues. United States labor strongly opposes the treaty
on the ground that it will steal American jobs. See, e.g., Dowling, supra note 16, at 355-56. Curiously,
however, employment is one of the least frequently discussed issues when a U.S. corporation rushes
to take advantage of the EC single market. Yet employment costs are as important to a U.S. company
considering starting or expanding European operations as they are to a U.S. corporation eyeing
Mexico, only for the opposite reason.
26. A thorough explication of the history of the social Europe agenda is beyond the scope of this
article, but elsewhere this author has discussed this history in detail. See Dowling, supra note 4, at
571-96; see also Donald C. Dowling, Jr., The Debate Over Social Europe, A.B.A. EUR. L. BULL.,
12/90, at 1; Donald C. Dowling, Jr., The EC's Movement Toward Worker "Consultation and Partici-
pation, " A.B.A. EUR. L. BULL. 17 (Winter 1991); Donald C. Dowling, Jr., Employment Matters
and the Social Charter, in LAWYERING IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (Folsom et al. eds., 1992);
Donald C. Dowling, Jr., The First Year-and-a-Half Under the EC Social Charter, A.B.A. EUR. L.
BULL. (Summer 1991); Donald C. Dowling, Jr., LaborIssues Muddy Steps Toward 1992, CINCINNATI
ENQUIRER, Sept. 3, 1990, at D2; Donald C. Dowling, Jr., "L'Europa Sociale": ll Punto di Vista
delle Impresse Multinazionali USA, INDUSTRA E SINDACATO (Italy), June 23-July 5, 1991, at 16;
Donald C. Dowling, Jr., Social Continental Europe, A.B.A. EUR. L. BULL. 14 (Spring 1992).
Another comprehensive survey of social Europe is Terence P. Stewart & Delphine A. Abellard, Labor
Laws and Social Policies in the European Community After 1992, 23 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 507
(1992).
27. See Dowling, supra note 4, at 572-73.
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labor laws more like those on the continent than like those in the United States.28
In short, from a U.S. perspective the internal employment laws within all the
EC Member States are decidedly proworker. Yet while this generalization holds
true throughout the Community, the specific employment principles internal to the
various Member States have, for centuries, differed widely. The vast substantive
differences in employment laws among the Member States can (and do) cause real
headaches for corporations that employ workers in more than one Member State,
and for corporations that move employees among Member States.29
In mapping out its single market program, Brussels realized that in order to
create a true EC single market, it would have to iron out the chief differences in
the Member States' employment laws and traditions. 30 But centuries of laws and
traditions die hard, especially when their guardians are major corporations or
trade unions.
The documents that created the single EC market, the White Paper and the
Single European Act, were conspicuously quiet, but not silent, on social matters.31
Social Europe was simply too big a problem for Brussels to tackle along with the
threshold trade issues on which these documents focused. So at first Brussels put
social issues in the back seat, leaving harmonization of trade concerns up front.32
Throughout the single market program's early years, a small group of EC-con-
nected trade unionists issued a series of documents championing their dream
of a worker-protective social Europe.33 Eventually EC Commission President
Jacques Delors sensed a wide enough commitment to the single market program
among European business to justify a Social Charter, which would lay out the
basic rights the EC would guarantee all its workers, regardless of Member State
affiliation.
31
In 1989, at Delors's invitation, the Commission issued a twelve-point Social
Charter,35 to be implemented by the Commission's Social Action Program,36 a
28. See J. PEEL, THE REAL POWER GAME: A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 168-
73 (1979).
29. See, e.g., Victor K. Kiam, Fortress Europe 1992? Don't Hold Your Breath, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 11, 1989, at A18 (Remington Products CEO Victor K. Kiam complains that differences among
EC Member States' employment laws hamper U.S. operations in Europe, and argues that these
differences will prevent any true EC single market).
30. Besides harmonization of employment laws, Brussels' other chief reason for creating a social
Europe was to alleviate unemployment by spreading around existing work. See, e.g., Dowling, supra
note 4, at 585-89.
31. See Dowling, supra note 4, at 578-80 & 580-81 n.90, and citations therein.
32. See id. at 580-84.
33. See id. at 585-89 and citations therein.
34. Letter from Jacques Delors and Manuel Marin to Chairman of the Economic and Social Com-
mittee (Nov. 8, 1988), reprinted in COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, DIRECTORATE-
GENERAL FOR EMPLOYMENT, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, SOCIAL EUROPE 1/90, at
80 (1990) [hereinafter SOCIAL EUROPE].
35. Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights [hereinafter Charter].
36. Communication from the Commission Concerning Its Action Programme Relating to the
Implementation of the Community Charter of Basic Social Rights for Workers, COM(89)568 final
[hereinafter Social Action Program].
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White paper of sorts that called for forty-seven specific social instruments under
the twelve Charter rights. Brussels debated and revised various drafts of the
Charter between May and November 1989, ultimately putting the document to
a Council vote at the meeting in Strasbourg in December 1989. 37 Because a
provision in the amended Treaty of Rome requires unanimous votes on most
employment issues, the employer lobby argued that in order for the Charter to
pass, it had to win the vote of all twelve Member States. To no one's surprise,
Britain's Margaret Thatcher, long an outspoken critic of the social Europe con-
cept, cast a lone blackball. As a result, Britain and the employers proclaimed that
the Charter had lost, even though it enjoyed the support of a nonunanimous 11-to- 1
majority.38
While the Charter's failure was a setback for the social Europe movement, the
Commission essentially ignored Thatcher's blackball. During the next two years
(1990 and 1991), the Commission went on to propose many of the forty-seven
instruments that the Social Action Program called for, just as if the Charter had
passed in the first place. Yet Britain (first through Thatcher and then through her
successor John Major) vetoed most of these social measures. Only at Maastricht
did the balance of power change.
D. THE DECEMBER 1991 MAASTRICHT DECISION TO
EXCLUDE BRITAIN FROM THE EC SOCIAL AGENDA
Britain ultimately proved a victim of its own success. Frustrated by the stale-
mated veto years, the other Member States began applying tremendous pressure
to forge some kind of workable program on employment issues. These Member
States pressured the Council into including social issues as one of the topics at
the EC's intergovernmental conference on economic and political union (the
equivalent of a constitutional convention), which culminated in the December
1991 Council meeting at Maastricht.
At Maastricht the Council considered the first substantive changes to the EC
treaty since the Single European Act-changes not only in social policy, but in
monetary and political policy, as well. While the Maastrict proposals did not
purport finally to resolve every outstanding concern regarding economic and
political union, they did result in an important Council-level consensus regarding
some key substantive amendments to the treaty itself.39 The Maastricht meeting
also yielded a surprising, late-in-the-day breakup of the social Europe logjam.
37. See Dowling, supra note 4, at 590-94, and citations therein.
38. See id.
39. For example, at Maastricht the Council agreed on a 1999 deadline for economic union, gave
Parliament a new veto power, and reached important agreements on defense policy and immigration
matters. See COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND COMMISSION OFTHE EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITIES, [PROPOSED] TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION 62-64 (1992) [hereinafter MAASTRICHT] (signed
Feb. 7, 1992 after agreement in principle reached on Dec. 10, 1992).
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In the months leading up to the Maastricht meeting, both sides of the social
Europe debate had entrenched themselves into their prior positions: Britain and
Europe's employers tried to water down the Social Action Program to as weak
a level as possible, 4° while the social Europe mavens, now led by France, de-
manded that the Council comprehensively regulate the EC workplace. A major
argument involved whether the EC should change the amended Treaty of Rome's
article 100, to apply nonunanimous, qualified majority voting to all social matters,
not just to health and safety issues. Britain and the employers, of course, forcefully
resisted this proposal. But France, Germany, and Italy threatened to reject all
the Maastricht economic and political union treaty changes unless the package
contained a new social chapter for the treaty, one that included broad qualified
majority voting.
At Maastricht, at the final hour, an unanticipated compromise emerged, one
unparalleled in the history of the single market program. The Council ministers
decided to carve Britain out of the EC's entire social agenda, leaving the eleven
continental Member States41 to legislate the Charter and Social Action Program's
broad social Europe program .42 Britain would not participate in creating or passing
social instruments, and social instruments, once passed, would not apply in Brit-
ain.43 The eleven continental Member States would form an entirely new body,
which would exist as a sort of parallel universe to the EC, cloning the EC's
institutions, procedures, and even prior instrument proposals. Europe would forge
ahead on social issues without Britain.
While the popular press focused on those aspects of the Maastricht treaty
dealing with economic and political union, a six-page protocol and agreement
within the 256-page proposed Maastricht treaty44 sets out a blueprint for a wide-
ranging social union. The Maastricht treaty's Protocol on Social Policy, 45 which
40. For Britain's position on social issues leading up to the Maastricht treaty, see Union Come-
back, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 23, 1991, at 81. For a general discussion of Britain's intransigence on
social matters, see P. TEAGUE, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: THE SOCIAL DIMENSION 64-81 (1989).
For EC employers' position on social issues leading up to the Maastricht treaty, see UNICE Submission
to the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on Political Union: Special Considerations as Regards
Social Policy (Mar. 18, 1991).
41. Actually, "continental Europe" in this context is the ten continental Member States, plus
Ireland. For brevity, this article refers to these eleven Member States as the continental Member
States.
42. Technically, the continental Member States carved themselves out, forming a sui generis
body that would create a social union to be implemented apart from the EC treaty structure. Britain
remained free to opt in. (The social compromise was therefore the opposite of the Maastricht economic
union compromise, which simply carved out Britain.)
43. For contemporaneous overviews of the two-tier Maastricht social compromise, see The Deal
Is Done, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 14, 1991, at 51-54; EC Exempts Britain from Complying with EC
Labor Legislation, 239 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at Al (Dec. 12, 1991); EC Exempts Great Britain
from Complying with Labor Laws, 138 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 535 (1991); U.K. Will Be Exempt from
Complying with Labor Policy, CoiRP. COUNS. WEEKLY (BNA) 5 (Dec. 18, 1991).
44. MAASTRICHT, supra note 39.
45. Id. at 196 [hereinafter Social Protocol].
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incorporates the Agreement on Social Policy Concluded between the Member
States of the European Community with the Exception of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland,46 formally proposes carving Britain out of the
EC social lawmaking structure and establishes a new qualified majority voting
scheme by which forty-eight votes-instead of the fifty-four votes needed for a
qualified majority when Britain participates-could pass social legislation.47
Besides carving Britain out of the social Europe process, the Agreement sets
forth three other key innovations. First, the Agreement would expand the number
of social law subjects by which a qualified majority can pass instruments, from
merely health and safety issues to all issues involving health and safety, working
conditions, worker information and consultation, sexual equality, and "the inte-
gration of persons excluded from the labour market. -48 However, unanimous
voting would remain necessary to pass instruments on social security and social
protection, employment contract terminations, collective bargaining, immigra-
tion from countries outside the EC, and "financial contributions for promotion
of employment and job-creation.49
Second, the Agreement for the first time formally recognizes the involvement
of the so-called "social partners," the pan-European lobbying associations repre-
senting employers (chiefly UNICE, the Union des Conf~ddrations de l'Industrie
et des Employeurs d'Europe) and unions (chiefly ETUC, the European Trade
Union Confederation). 50 Under the Agreement, a Member State could delegate
46. Id. at 197 [hereinafter Agreement on Social Policy].
47. Compare Social Protocol, supra note 45, 2 with EEC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 148(2).
Announcing this new two-tier approach in a press conference on December 11, 1991, EC Commission
President Jacques Delors explained that agreeing to the plan was the only way continental Europe
could avoid further watering down the Charter, supra note 35, and Social Action Program, supra note
36. EC Exempts Great Britain from Complying with Labor Laws, supra note 43, at 536. Delors
promised that post-Maastricht social developments would not be too avant garde. The continental
Member States would balance two goals: the need to legislate conservatively enough to insulate the
EC's less economically developed areas, versus the need to avoid social dumping. Id
The reaction to the Maastricht two-tier approach was predictable. British Prime Minister John
Major emerged "very happy," and European union leaders, speaking through the European Trade
Union Congress, lauded the compromise as a "major success." Id. at 537. However, Europe's
employers, speaking through their umbrella UNICE (The Union des Conf6d6rations de l'Industrie
et des Employeurs d'Europe), decried the two-tier approach "as an extremely negative step." Id. at
536. UNICE lambasted the compromise for unfairly setting up Britain as "a foreign investors'
paradise" at the expense of the continental Member States, complaining that it is "bizarre to have
... corporations in 11 Member States hav[ing] to respect much stricter and more expensive social
legislation than corporations in one Member State." Id. at 536. UNICE also charged that, under the
re-weighted qualified majority voting system that would apply without Britain, a mere handful of
large and rich Member States would be able to railroad through restrictive social legislation, crippling
industry in a majority of smaller dissenting Member States. UNICE added that the scheme would
make Britain the "Hong Kong of Europe." Financially Sound, Socially Insecure, THE ECONOMIST,
Dec. 14, 1991, at 70.
48. Agreement on Social Policy, supra note 46, art. 2(1).
49. Id. art. 2(3).
50. That the traditional adversaries of management and labor are together called "partners"
points up the ironies of Eurospeak.
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implementation of social instruments to the social partners "at their joint re-
quest. 51 Much more importantly, in a provision unique to EC law, the Agreement
requires the Commission to submit all draft social instruments to the social part-
ners for nine months of consultation and collective bargaining, during which
the social partners can either jointly recommend changes to proposals or enter
collective agreements on the topic of a proposal, rendering the proposal itself
obsolete.52
The Agreement's third substantive amendment to EC social law is its introduc-
tion of the affirmative action concept regarding sexual equality. The text of the
Treaty of Rome lays out the goal of sexual equality as a straightforward ban on
discrimination.53 However, the Agreement expressly allows Member States to
"[m]aintai[n] or adop[t] measures providing for specific advantages in order to
make it easier for women to pursue a vocational activity or to prevent or compen-
sate for disadvantages in their professional careers."
54
If adopted, the Protocol and Agreement would break up Britain's historic
blockade of the passage of a social Europe. They would also seem to change
the way Brussels itself will legislate a social Europe. Even if the Protocol and
Agreement were fully implemented, however, a key political reality undermines
their actual application: these documents do not repeal anything in the Treaty of
Rome. They merely exist as an optional parallel universe, to be used only if
Britain tries to block a specific piece of social legislation.
Because there is within the EC a great pressure to pass laws as part of the acquis
communautaire (the body of law applicable EC-wide), all Member States favoring
any proposed EC instrument would prefer to see that instrument apply EC-wide.55
The plan behind Continental Europe's support for the Maastricht treaty's Social
Protocol is the theory that the very threat of invoking the Social Protocol procedure
for any given proposed instrument would probably be enough to win Britain's
reluctant acquiescence. Otherwise, Britain could be accused of diminishing the
acquis communautaire and further isolating itself as an EC-law outsider. Hence,
while the Social Protocol reads as an innovation unique to EC law, even if ratified,
it may prove to be little more than the clever political ploy that forced Britain to
51. Agreement on Social Policy, supra note 46, art. 2(4).
52. Id. arts. 3-4. The nine-month period is rumored to have been inspired by the EC's draft
instrument on pregnancy rights, which the Commission's social affairs Directorate-General had been
considering shortly before it turned its attention to the Maastricht treaty.
53. EEC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 119.
54. Agreement on Social Policy, supra note 46, art. 6(3).
55. One reason for the EC's fixation with the acquis communautaire is the growing strength of
the EC's relationship with the EFTA (European Free Trade Agreement) countries after the Council's
tentative approval of the European Economic Area Agreement on February 14, 1992. As EC/EFTA
ties became stronger, and as EC law becomes stronger within the EFTA countries, the EC would like
as much of its law (the acquis communautaire) as possible to be eligible to apply to EFTA countries.
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relax its veto of the social Europe agenda proposed under the original Treaty of
Rome.56
E. THE MAASTRICHT TREATY AFTER THE DANISH VETO
In the months after the EC heads of state signed the Maastricht treaty in princi-
ple, all concerned set about studying the lengthy treaty and preparing for life after
its ratification. While the internal laws of a few of the Member States technically
required that a popular referendum ratify the treaty, from January to May of 1992
almost everyone involved in EC affairs seemed to assume that the Maastricht
treaty would shortly become law, bringing to a close the 1992 single market
chapter of the EC's history.57
Then, on June 2, 1992, Denmark shocked the world by vetoing the Maastricht
treaty, sinking it by less than 50,000 votes and a 50.7 percent to 49.3 percent
margin.58 Denmark's veto turned the tide of EC popular opinion. On September
20, 1992, even France, the traditionally pro-EC homeland of the Commission
President Jacques Delors, voted to ratify the Maastricht treaty only by a 2 percent
margin. 59 Delors himself, the architect of the single European market, scrambled
to convince the EC's voters that the treaty, if ratified, would not turn the EC into
a superstate. Delors, humbled more than he had been since before the White Paper
was issued in 1985, admitted that the EC bureaucracy in Brussels had to become
more transparent and accountable to the EC citizenry. 6° In a ground-breaking
speech in Strasbourg on June 10, 1992, Delors announced that the Commission
would "redouble its efforts" to get the Maastricht treaty ratified, starting with
an "examination of its collective conscience.',61
Thus, in late 1992 the fate of the Maastricht treaty, and with it its Social Protocol
and Agreement on Social Policy, remained uncertain. However, the Social Proto-
col and the Agreement's substantive innovations, which had been hastily drawn
up the prior December, seemed to have acquired enough gravitational force to
56. For analyses of the Maastricht Social Protocol and Agreement discussing these issues, see
UNICE Position Paper, The Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty (Apr. 28, 1992, unpublished);
Confederation of British Industry, Social Europe After Maastricht (Mar. 1992, unpublished); Zyg-
munt Tyszkiewicz, Social Policy After Maastricht (July 1992) (unpublished paper by Secretary-
General of UNICE).
57. See, e.g., Unfinished Business, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 4, 1992, at 43. By the end of this
period, however, some nascent anti-EC feelings were growing among the Member States' citizenry.
See, e.g., Peter Gumbel, Europe's Spirits Over Unity Begin to Sink, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 1992,
at A10.
58. A comprehensive, contemporary analysis of the Danish vote appears in Peter Gumbel, EC
Shocker: European Unity Plan Receives Big Setback in Danes' Referendum, WALL ST. J., June 3,
1992, at Al.
59. Ireland, the only other Member State that had a referendum on Maastricht under its internal
law, voted to approve the treaty, on June 18, 1992, sixteen days after the Danish veto.
60. Radigales, DelorsNo Quiere Convertirla CEEenun Superestado, ELPERI6DICO (Barcelona),
June 11, 1992, at A12.
61. Id. (translations by this author).
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enable them to survive, in one form or another, regardless of the ultimate fate of
the Maastricht treaty itself.
In any event, because even the Maastricht Protocol's social scheme did not
eradicate the previously existing regime for social regulation under the Treaty of
Rome, regardless of the fate of the Maastricht Social Protocol, the two years'
worth of proposed social instruments that the Commission had offered up during
1990 and 1991 remained, at the close of 1992, a viable blueprint for the future
of social Europe. Posturally, these proposals remained ready to be acted upon
and implemented, regardless of the ultimate fate of the Maastricht treaty. To
examine these pending social proposals issued under the Charter and Social Action
Program's twelve rights, therefore, is to divine the Commission's own view of
the future of social Europe.
II. The EC Charter's Twelve Employment Law
Rights and the Status of Their Implementation
In 1992, even after the Danish veto of the Maastricht treaty, that a true social
Europe (albeit possibly a continental social Europe) would some day appear was,
for the first time, virtually assured. In 1992, the single market program's final
year, the continental EC appeared close to finally considering seriously whether
to adopt the Commission's 1990-91 package of social Europe proposals within
each of the twelve Charter rights-be these ultimately adopted under the Treaty
of Rome or under the proposed Maastricht procedures.
A. RIGHT TO FREE MOVEMENT
The first of the Charter's twelve rights, and therefore the first part of the social
Europe framework, is the right to free movement. This right is meant to ensure
free emigration among all EC Member States, "enabl[ing] any worker to engage
in any occupation or profession in the Community in accordance with the princi-
ples of equal treatment as regards access to employment, working conditions and
social protection in the host country., 62
While even the 1985 White Paper had set out ambitious goals for the free
movement right, Brussels has been slow to implement them. As late as 1991
the Commission complained: "[T]he completion of work aimed at facilitating
mobility still depends on the extension of recognition of qualifications to all
regulated professions and on the reform of the arrangements under which workers
and their families obtain the right of residence." 63 Accordingly, Brussels' propos-
62. Charter, supra note 35, 2. Curiously, although freedom of movement is the Charter's first
right, the Social Action Program, supra note 36, misplaces it as the fourth right. The Social Action
Program also reshuffles some of the other rights. This article follows the ordering of rights in the
Charter.
63. Sixth Report, supra note 14, at 1.
VOL. 27, NO. 1
EC EMPLOYMENT LAW AFTER MAASTRICHT 13
als of residence rights for workers and on cross-border recognition of diplomas
and professional qualifications were effectively stalemated through the close of
1992. 64
The Commission had proposed just one free movement directive expressly
under the Charter itself (as opposed to proposals under the White Paper): the
1991 Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning the Posting of Workers in the
Framework of the Provision of Services.65 This proposal attempts to iron out
competition problems among service businesses operating across Member State
lines, that is, the problems that arise when an employer from a low-wage Member
State assigns a worker to a temporary posting in a high-wage state.66
The proposal would require that a worker employed in one Member State who
is assigned to another state for more than three months per year receive the
protection of the host Member State's laws regarding work hours, holiday time,
minimum wage, subcontracting, health and safety, pregnancy and child care, and
antidiscrimination protections. 67 The goal is to prevent, for example, a Portuguese
company from winning the low bid on a Danish construction project, and then
staffing the job with Portuguese construction workers earning 1.5 to 3 ECU per
hour, when their now out-of-work Danish counterparts would have received 13.32
to 18.39 ECU.68
B. RIGHT TO FAIR PLAY
The Charter's second right addresses minimum pay, assuring that employment
shall be fairly remunerated" at a "decent standard of living." 69 In the EC, the
minimum wage structure is more complex than the United States model of a lowest
legal dollar rate per hour. While certain Member States do use the United States
model, others set minimum wages by collective bargaining agreement consensus
(either Member-Statewide or industrywide). Still other Member States set mini-
mum wages by Wage Councils or Joint Labour Committees.7 ° In a move towards
harmonizing along the lines of the United States model, in May 1991 the Commis-
64. See id. at 18-19. Nevertheless, Brussels is making headway in quite a few free movement-
related areas outside of the employment arena, including asylum, external frontiers, cooperation
among police forces, drug control, immigration policy, and customs matters pertaining to individuals.
See id. at 14-15.
65. Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning the Posting of Workers in the Framework of
the Provision of Services, COM(91)230 final SYN 346 (Aug. 1, 1991) [hereinafter Proposal].
66. Id. at 4:
A particular problem arises ... where a Member State places obligations, notably with regard to pay, on firms
based in and working on its territory, and these firms are faced with competition-for a specific task carried out
within that same Member State-from a firm based elsewhere and not subject to the same obligations. Legitimate
competition between firms is then overlaid by potentially distortive effects between national requirements.
67. Id. at 21-22, art. 3, §§ 1-2.
68. Figures are from table, id. at 5, showing lowest and highest collective bargaining agreement
"Hourly Wages in ECU in the Construction Industry."
69. Charter, supra note 35, 1 5.
70. Proposal, supra note 65, at 6.
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sion issued a modest draft recommendation asking each Member State to take a
first step by implementing its own statutory minimum wage.
C. RIGHT TO IMPROVED WORKING CONDITIONS
In addition to regulating wages, the Charter, as its third right, seeks to control
working "conditions," including "forms of employment other than open-ended
contracts, such as fixed-term contracts, part-time working, temporary work and
seasonal work."'" In an attempt to implement this, on August 13, 1990, the
Commission issued a three-part multiple draft directive on working conditions,
titled the Proposal for a Council Directive on Certain Employment Relationships
with Regard to Working Conditions, the Proposal for a Council Directive on
Certain Employment Relationships with Regard to Distortions of Competition,
and the Proposal for a Council Directive Supplementing the Measures to Encour-
age Improvements in the Safety and Health of Temporary Workers.72
The first of these three parts, the proposal on employment relationships, in-
volves part-time and temporary (seasonal and fixed duration) employment. This
instrument would require EC employers to treat their part-time and temporary
staffs "on the same footing as . . .other employees" in access to vocational
training, worker representation, benefits, social services, and internal promotions
to full-time or indefinite-duration positions.73
The second part of the August 1990 working conditions proposal, that on
employment relationships "with regard to distortions of competition," involves
limited-term contracts.74 In Europe even nonunion job holders typically are parties
to written employment contracts of indefinite duration. These contracts raise
many important aspects of employment relationships, including the terms of
discharge, to the level of law.75 EC workers employed under these contracts either
keep their jobs as long as they want or are bought out at a high price. Not
surprisingly, given the oppressive effects of such indefinite-length contracts on
employers, employers in Europe occasionally offer their workers definite length
contracts with a specific termination date (usually one year from the date of
contracting). These employers typically renew these contracts annually until the
71. Charter, supra note 35, 7-8. For a collection of the EC instruments on protection of
workers through 1990, and for citations to the interpretive case law, see EUROPEAN INFORMATION
SERVICES COMPENDIUM OF EC EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL SECURITY LAW 114-32, 1,006-09 (1990)
[hereinafter EUROPEAN INFORMATION SERVICES]. For further citations to EC working conditions law,
see A. BYRE, LEADING CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE SOCIAL POLICY OF THE EEC 315-402 (1989).
72. Proposal for a Council Directive on Certain Employment Relationships with Regard to Distor-
tions of Competition, COM(90)228 final SYN 280 [hereinafter Distortions]; Proposal for a Council
Directive Supplementing the Measures to Encourage Improvements in the Safety and Health of
Temporary Workers, COM(90)228 final SYN 281 [hereinafter Temporary Workers].
73. Proposal for a Council Directive on Certain Employment Relationships with Regard to Work-
ing Conditions, COM(90)228 final.
74. Distortions, supra note 72.
75. See Dowling, supra note 4, at 572-73.
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year the employer decides upon discharge. In an attempt to rectify this practice,
the proposal on distortions of competition would prohibit EC employers from
using fixed-term contracts for longer than thirty-six months.
Complementing this second proposal on work contracts, in November 1990
the Commission issued another, entirely separate draft directive7 6 that would
require employers to put all employment contracts in writing-spelling out the
applicable working conditions and the duration of the contract. On October
14, 1991, the Council actually adopted a revised version of this directive,
making this one of the very few pre-Maastricht directives adopted under the
Social Action Program and effective in all Member States.77 This revised
directive (to be effective June 30, 1993) requires that virtually all employers
of Europeans provide each full-time employee, within two months of employ-
ment, with a writing that states the employer's identity, the time and hours of
work, the employee's job duties and classification, the duration of employment
if temporary, the applicable vacation policy, pretermination notice policy,
compensation and pay schedule, and citations to any applicable collective
bargaining agreements.78 If the employee is to be assigned abroad as an expatri-
ate, the writing must also address the duration of the foreign posting, the
currency to be used for payment, the "benefits in cash or kind attendant on
the employment abroad," and the conditions of repatriation.7 9
The third part of the Commission's tripartite working conditions proposal is a
draft directive ostensibly on improving safety and health for temporary workers.80
This proposed instrument, which involves both part-time and temporary employ-
ment, would require employers to articulate in their assignment contracts a de-
tailed job description setting out the hours of work and saying whether the job
falls within the category of major risks as defined in national legislation. The
proposal would also require employers to warn workers about the risks involved
in "any activity requiring special occupational qualifications or skills." 81 If neces-
sary, employers would have to provide their temporary workers with appropriate
training.
An entirely separate draft instrument on working conditions, issued in Novem-
ber 1991 (and approved by the EC Parliament on March 11, 1992, in a nonbinding
vote), would amend and expand a 1975 directive that requires employers of twenty
76. Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on the Provision of a Written Declaration
Concerning Employment Relationships, COM(90)563 (Nov. 28, 1990).
77. Council Directive 91/533 of 14 October 1991 on an Employer's Obligation to Inform Employ-
ees of the Conditions Applicable to the Contract or Employment Relationship, 1991 O.J. (L 288) 32.
78. Id., art. II, § 2.
79. Id., art. IV, § 1.
80. Temporary Workers, supra note 72. As this document appeared before the Maastricht treaty,
its drafters had an incentive to pitch it as a health and safety directive: Article 100a of the EEC Treaty,
supra note 5, recognizes qualified majority council voting for safety issues, but requires unanimous
voting for other employment-related issues. On article 100a, see Dowling, supra note 4, at 592-94.
81. Temporary Workers, supra note 72.
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or more employees to give advance notice to their workers of plant closings and
mass layoffs (collective redundancies), and to bargain or consult with workers
over these changes. 2 The 1991 proposal,83 plugging what the Commission openly
calls a "legal loophole,'"' 4 would apply the 1975 directive to conglomerates
headquartered in one EC Member State, but laying off workers in another.85
The new proposal would require home offices to pass down to local manage-
ment, for transmittal to workers or their representatives:
[T]he reasons for the projected redundancies, the number of workers normally em-
ployed, the employer's proposals with regard to the number and categories of workers
to be made redundant, the criteria proposed for the selection of the workers to be made
redundant, the proposed basis for any redundancy payments, and the period over which
the projected redundancies are to be effected.86
The motive for the new plant-closing proposal is the Commission's fear that
a trend toward "accelerating corporate restructuring, 8 ' exists: "An increasing
number of employees will be affected by key corporate decisions taken at a level
higher than their immediate employer, i.e., by the undertaking's head office, if
located in a different country." The Commission worries that the existing 1975
plant-closing legislation gives corporations' headquarters an incentive to withhold
from local management information necessary for meaningful plant-closing nego-
tiations."
Still another 1991 draft directive on work conditions involves work time. It
proposes regulating total hours, Sunday work, vacation, time off, and overtime.
The EC labor ministers, at a Council meeting on December 3, 1991, tentatively
showed strong support for this measure.
D. RIGHT TO SOCIAL PROTECTION
The Charter's fourth right guarantees "social protection," which means "an
adequate level of social security," and, for the unemployed, "sufficient resources
82. The 1975 directive, Directive 75/129/EEC, was the model for similar legislation that the
United States adopted over a decade later, in 1988. Compare Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification [WARN] Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1992) [hereinafter WARN Act]. See generally
Michele Floyd, Note, The Scope of Assistance for Dislocated Workers in the United States and the
European Community: WARN and Directive 75/129 Compared, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 436 (1992).
83. Proposal for a Council Directive Amending Directive 75/129/EEC on the Approximation of
the Laws of the Member States Relating to Collective Redundancies, COM(91)292 final (Nov. 13,
1991) [hereinafter Amending Directive].
84. Id. at 3.
85. Interestingly, parent/subsidiary issues also create unique problems under the U.S. WARN
Act, supra note 82. See, e.g., Electronic Workers Local 397 v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 7 I.E.R.
Cases 65 (D.C.N.J. 1992).
86. Amending Directive, supra note 83, at 15.
87. Id. at 5.
88. Id. at 4.
89. See id. at 5.
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and social assistance.' 90 EC legislation under this right would also extend to
pension regulation. In October 1991 the Commission issued a Proposal for a
Council Directive on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations, and Administrative
Provisions Relating to the Freedom of Management and Investment of Funds by
Institutions for Retirement Provision. This was a wide-ranging proposal that
would forbid Member States from requiring that local pension funds invest only
in their home state and that would also facilitate workers' freedom to transfer
pension benefits across Member State lines. It would also allow trans-European
employers to create a single pension fund for workers in all Member States.
E. RIGHT TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
The fifth section of the Charter would guarantee an EC right of collective
bargaining. 9' In 1992, collective bargaining in Europe remained independent
within each Member State. But the Single European Act, the Charter, and the
Social Action Program all actively encourage bargaining at the "European-
level. ' During 1991, the European employers' group UNICE (the Union des
Conf6d6rations de l'Industrie et des Employeurs d'Europe) took the surprising
position that it might initiate European-level collective bargaining itself to forestall
intrusive EC-wide employment regulation. 93 This position proved prophetic, to
the extent that the proposed Maastricht treaty attempts to give the social partners
a formal role in forming EC social law through collective-style bargaining on
legislation. 94
90. Charter, supra note 35, 10. The leading EC instruments on social security are the 1971
Council Regulation on the Application of Social Security Schemes to Employed Persons and Their
Families Moving Within the Community, Council Regulation (EEC) 1408/71, 1971 O.J. (L 149),
and the Council Regulation Fixing the Procedure for Implementing Council Regulation (EEC) 574/
72, 1972 O.J. (L 74). For the texts of these two regulations, and for citations to the voluminous Court
of Justice case law interpreting them, see EUROPEAN INFORMATION SERVICES, supra note 71, at 580-
945, 1012-79 (1990). For analyses of the decades of existing EC social security law, see A. ARNULL,
THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EEC LAW AND THE INDIVIDUAL 129-211 (1990); EUROPEAN FOUNDA-
TION FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF LIVING AND WORKING CONDITIONS 115-37 (1988); H. SMIT & P.
HERZOG, THE LAW OFTHE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 3-751.11-. 13 (1991). See also citations
in Dowling, supra note 4, at 601 n.226.
91. Charter, supra note 35, 11-14.
92. The Single European Act amends the treaty to encourage EC-level collective bargaining.
Single European Act, supra note 3, art. 22, amending EEC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 118 ("The
Commission shall endeavour to develop the dialogue between management and labour at European
level which could, if the two sides consider it desirable, lead to relations based on agreement"). See
also Charter, supra note 35, 12. The sole new initiative that the Social Action Program offers under
the collective bargaining right is a proposed communication on the "role of social partners in collective
bargaining" intended to promote "the development of collective bargaining including collective
agreements at European level with special reference to the settlement of disputes." Social Action
Program, supra note 36, at 30.
93. European Employers Group Considering Trans-European Collective Bargaining, 75 Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) at A5 (Apr. 18, 1991).
94. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
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F. RIGHT TO VOCATIONAL TRAINING
Brussels envisions a skilled work force staffing its post-1992 EC workplace.
Accordingly, the sixth section of the Charter attempts to improve skills by creating
a right to lifetime vocational training. 95 Indeed, vocational training has long been
an EC priority. The EC has an important and long-established program, the
European Social Fund, which is charged with training workers.96
Even though the Charter and Social Action Program seem to call for privately
financed vocational training programs, Brussels apparently could not resist ex-
panding its Community-financed vocational training schemes. In December 1990
the Community introduced the "Euroform" program, establishing a "Commu-
nity initiative concerning the new qualifications, new skills and new employment
opportunities induced by the completion of the internal market and technological
change." 97 Euroform, which unapologetically reinforces six other similar pro-
grams, 98 will impose a 300 million ECU cost on the EC's structural funds for
1990-93 alone, and the Member States will have to cofinance the program by
contributing even more money. 99
G. RIGHT TO EQUAL TREATMENT BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN
As its seventh right the Charter seeks to outlaw sex discrimination in employ-
ment,' °° a prohibition that for some years has existed within the EC Member
States and also under Community law.' 0' To further this right, on October 17,
1990, the Commission issued a Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning the
Protection at Work of Pregnant Women, or Women Who Have Recently Given
Birth.' 2 After failing to reach an agreement on this proposal at the June 1991
95. Charter, supra note 35, 15.
96. SMIT & HERZOG, supra note 90, at 3-773 to -843; TEAGUE, supra note 40, at 42-56, 124-
28. See citations in Dowling, supra note 4, at 603 n.237. Also, in 1990, the Commission launched
a program to promote transnational networks for vocational training. See Sixth Report, supra note
14, at 8.
97. Notice to the Member States Laying Down Guidelines for Operational Programmes/Global
Grants Which Member States Are Invited to Establish, in the Framework of a Community Initiative
Concerning New Qualifications, New Skills, and New Employment Opportunities-Euroform Initia-
tive, 1990 O.J. (C 327) 3.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 5.
100. Charter, supra note 35, 17. EEC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 119 mandates "equal [pay] for
equal work."
101. Since 1975, the EC has been harmonizing laws on equal pay and equal treatment. See, e.g.,
Council Directive on the Approximation of the Laws of the Member States Relating to the Application
of the Principle of Equal Pay for Men and Women, Council Directive (EEC) 75/117, 1975 O.J. (L
45) 19; Council Directive on the Implementation of the Principle of Equal Treatment for Men
and Women as Regards Access to Employment, Vocational Training and Promotion and Working
Conditions, Council Directive (EEC) 76/207. For a collection of the EC instruments on equal pay
and equal treatment through 1990, and for citations to the lead cases on this topic, see BYRE, supra
note 71, at 7-310; and EUROPEAN INFORMATION SERVICES, supra note 71, at 73-108, 998-1,005.
102. COM(90)406 final SYN 303.
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Council Meeting, on November 6, 1991, the Council's social ministers actually
did unanimously approve a slightly watered-down version of this directive, mak-
ing this the first noteworthy piece of Social Action Program legislation to get past
the Council, at least provisionally. However, when the social affairs Council next
met in early December 1991, Spain and Portugal withdrew their support for this
instrument, citing its cost.
This proposed directive addresses two disparate maternity issues: safety (expo-
sure to agents causing potential fetal harm) and leave (time off for childbirth and
breast-feeding). The directive would first require that Member States protect
pregnant and breast-feeding women by forcing employers to eliminate all danger-
ous physical, chemical, and biological agents on their jobs.o 3 The document
specifies precisely which agents Member States would outlaw.104 The instrument
would further require Member States to ensure that some "alternative to night
work" be available to pregnant women for sixteen weeks surrounding their ex-
pected delivery date. 1
05
Separately, regarding maternity leave, the instrument notes that the average
legally mandated EC maternity leave within the twelve Member States is already
fifteen weeks, with a minimum of twelve weeks and a maximum of forty.
l °6
Notwithstanding the Member States' already generous protection levels, the first
draft of the proposal required that those pregnant women who inform employers
of their pregnancy in advance get "an uninterrupted period of at least 14 weeks'
leave from work on full pay and/or a corresponding allowance, commencing
before and ending after delivery. "1 07 However, the Council removed the require-
ment that leave pay be at full salary; the next draft said the pay need only be at
the rate of sick pay (which in Europe, generally, is 75 percent of full pay). Still,
any sickness leave during pregnancy would be in addition to this leave.108 Member
States could choose to mandate more than fourteen weeks' leave "not on full pay,
as long as an equivalent standard of protection is assured."'09
Additionally, the instrument would prohibit employers from discriminating
against pregnant women. ° Surprising as it may be to U.S.-based employers
accustomed to a presumption of innocence, the proposal would put a burden of
proof on employers to disprove that any adverse employment action they took
103. Id. art. 4.
104. Id. Annex I.
105. Id. art. 3, 3. While this instrument's protections may seem logical, the proposal, interest-
ingly, runs contrary to the spirit of a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, which prohibits U.S.
employers from enacting fetal protection policies that exclude women of "childbearing age" even
from demonstrably-hazardous jobs. Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
106. This is in sharp contrast to U.S. law, which does not mandate any maternity leave at all.
107. Draft directive, supra note 102, art. 5(1), 1.
108. Id. 2.
109. Id.
110. Id. art. 6(2).
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was on account of an employee's pregnancy. 11' This system could actually relax
a doctrine in certain Member States, including Italy, which flatly prohibits
discharging pregnant women, regardless of the reason or quality of proof.
During 1991 the Commission also issued a proposed recommendation on child
care, provisionally approved by the Council on December 3, which strongly
urged the Member States to create comprehensive child care programs aimed
at facilitating working parents. 112 Also during 1991, the Commission issued a
recommendation for a code of conduct on the dignity of men and women at work
(an antiharassment measure).113 In December, the EC Council of labor ministers
issued a declaration supporting this recommendation.
114
H. RIGHT TO WORKER CONSULTATION AND
PARTICIPATION IN MANAGEMENT
The Charter's most controversial proposal is its eighth guarantee of worker
access to management information and worker participation in corporate affairs
affecting employment. '15 While the worker consultation and participation concept
is familiar to U.S. labor academics, until recently it was wholly foreign to U.S.
employers. Even U.S. union leaders saw management participation as outside
their scope of expertise. 116 Only very recently has worker consultation and partici-
pation (known in the United States as worker cooperation) become a factor in
U.S. industrial relations. The reason it has emerged in the United States is because
of the success of employers who use it abroad, such as in Germany and, in a
different format, in Japan. 1
17
111. In 1991 the EC Court of Justice issued a pair of decisions extending maternity rights by
clarifying that employers have a high burden of proof regarding absence of discriminatory intent.
Case 177/88, Dekker v. Stichting Vormingscentrum Voor Jonge Volwassen Plus, I.R.L.R. 27; Case
179/88, Handels-Og Kontorfunkitionaerenes Forbund I Danmark v. Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening, 1
C.M.L.R. 8 (1991), 1991 I.R.L.R. 31.
112. Proposal for a Council Recommendation on Child Care, COM(91)233 final (Aug. 28, 1991).
113. COM(91)232 final (Aug. 27, 1991).
114. Just as the Clarence Thomas hearings brought sexual harassment to public attention in the
United States in 1991, Europe also focused on the issue that year. France and Spain actually imposed
criminal penalties (up to one year in prison) for workplace harassment.
115. Charter, supra note 35, 17-18 (approved draft of Charter contains two consecutive
paragraphs numbered "17").
116. A surprising number of U.S. scholarly studies of the worker participation concept exist,
speculating on what role worker participation might play in U.S. labor relations. See citations in
Dowling, supra note 4, at 606 n.258. Cf. Martin M. Perline & David J. Poynter, The Effects of Worker
Participation Plans on Union Views of Managerial Prerogatives, 40 LAB. L.J. 37, 38-39 (1989)
(survey finds most U.S. union leaders believe many aspects of management are most properly left
outside scope of collective bargaining).
117. Cf. Kathleen K. Brickley, Labor Management Cooperation: Summary of the Electromation
Case, 43 LAB. L.J. 395 (1992); Harold J. Datz, Employee Participation Programs: Are They Lawful
Under the National Labor Relations Act?, 8 LAB. LAW. 81, 82 (1992); Owen E. Herrnstadt, Why
Some Unions Hesitate to Participate in Labor-Management Cooperation Programs, 8 LAB. LAW. 71,
71 (1992); Joy K. Reynolds, A Perspective on the Electromation Case from the U.S. Department of
Labor, 43 LAB. L.J. 397 (1992). Ironically, while in Europe employers resist worker participation
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Certain northern European Member States' national labor law systems-most
notably Germany's-have long ceded generous management participation rights
to labor. The northern European worker consultation and participation concept
encompasses worker rights to information, consultation, and true participation in
management decisions. Under these systems, labor representatives get advance
notice of management's plans that would affect the workplace. Labor then gets
a chance to consult and participate in those management affairs that affect employ-
ment, including corporate mergers, technological changes, restructurings of oper-
ations, and transfrontier employment issues.
The Charter and Social Action Program effectively reject the historic link
between EC worker participation and company law that had turned up in various
proposals for a European company statute, leaving the future of any such connec-
tion in the hands of those drafting the EC's company law instruments. "' Instead,
the Charter and Social Action Program call for an unrestricted right of worker
consultation and participation for employees of corporations operating in more
than one Member State. "9 To effect this, the Social Action Program proposes an
instrument that would establish "equivalent systems of worker participation in all
European-scale enterprises." 120 Employer "enterprises" would have to provide
their workers with "general and periodic information" regarding those aspects
of company development affecting employment.' 2 ' Trans-European employers
would therefore have to consult with worker representatives "before taking any
decision liable to have serious consequences for the interests of employees, in
particular, closures, transfers, curtailment of activities, substantial changes with
regard to organization, working practices, production methods, long-term cooper-
ation and other undertakings."
2 2
On January 25, 1991, under this section of the Social Action Program, the
Commission issued a Proposal for a Council Directive on the Establishment
of a European Works Council in Community-Scale Undertakings or Groups of
and labor lobbies for it (see discussion infra), as these articles show, in the U.S. employers push for
worker cooperation while unions resist it. Pointing out just how backward the United States is on
this issue, in 1992 worker cooperation was considered to be illegal pending en banc review in
the eagerly-awaited National Labor Relations Board decision Electromation, Inc., NLRB Case No.
25-CA-19818.
118. For a discussion of the historic link between EC company law proposals and worker consulta-
tion and participation, see SOCIAL EUROPE, supra note 34, § 2.2.1.3; Dowling, supra note 4, at 606-
09. This author has, elsewhere, examined how worker participation fits into the EC's movement
toward a single corporate form. Donald C. Dowling, Jr., How Does Europe Regulate Power Within
Its Corporations? What Might the Answer Meanfor the U.S. ?, 12 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 601 (1992).
119. See Charter, supra note 35, 17 (worker consultation and participation requirement "shall
apply especially in companies or groups of companies having establishments or companies in two or
more Member States of the European Community"). The Social Action Program leaves to the
Member States the question of what worker consultation and participation obligations purely domestic
employers should have. Social Action program, supra note 36, at 31-34.
120. Social Action Program, supra note 36, at 32-33.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 33.
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Undertakings for the Purposes of Informing and Consulting Employees. 123 On
September 16, 1991, the Commission updated this with an Amended Proposal.124
This Works Council proposal would cover only those EC employers (or groups
of employers) "with at least 1,000 employees within the Community including
100 employees in at least each of two Member States.,125 Employers not meeting
this threshold would simply remain subject to whatever applicable worker partici-
pation law might apply in the Member States in which they operate.
The proposed Works Councils directive would require that covered employers'
existing labor representatives (or else employees whom the work force elected) sit
on an in-house labor/management committee, the European Works Council, meeting
regularly with management as a special negotiating body, and discussing issues
affecting employment. 126 Management would have to inform the Works Council "of
the progress of the undertaking's ... business and of its prospects. This information
[would have to] relate in particular to [the employer's] structure, economic and
financial situation, the probable development of the business and of production and
sales, the employment situation and probable trends, and investment prospects."'
27
Just as the worker consultation and participation concept has always been the most
volatile aspect of the EC's proposed social agenda, this Works Council draft directive
is the most controversial component of the Commission's 1990-91 package of draft
Social Action Program proposals. The Works Council proposal is a compromise
that, to hard-core union activitists, is too watered down. It does not apply to enough
employers, and it focuses too much on information and consultation to the exclusion
of active participation. However, to large employers, especially to those based in the
United States, this proposal reads as a major encroachment on management's right
to run a business. Unfortunately for these employers, if the Maastricht proposal's
two-tier approach is ever ratified, it would open the doors to broad social legislation
in the continental EC, 2 s and this Works Council directive-or some instrument quite
like it-would likely receive Council approval.
Apart from the Works Council directive, in July 1991 the Commission also
issued a proposal under the only remaining topic on this right under which the
Social Action Program calls for legislation: 129 employee profit participation. 3 0 On
123. COM(90)581 final. The Parliament approved this draft on July 9, 1991.
124. COM(91)345 final.
125. Id. § 1, art. 2(a). With this language, the instrument would cover more employers than had
the analogous January draft. That draft had covered only employers "with at least 1,000 employees
within the Community and with at least two establishments in different Member States each employing
at least 100 employees." COM(90)581 final, § 1, art. 2(a).
126. COM(91) 345 final, § 2, art. 5(2).
127. Id. Annex § l(c).
128. See supra text accompanying notes 66-75.
129. Cf. Social Action Program, supra note 36, at 34. Brussels' initiatives in the area of consultation
regarding collective redundancies, or layoffs, are categorized as working conditions proposals. See
supra text accompany note 83.
130. Proposal for a Council Recommendation Concerning the Promotion of Employee Participa-
tion in Profits and Enterprise Results (Including Equity Participation), COM(91)259 final (July 29,
1991).
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July 16, 1991, the Commission issued a Proposal for a Council Recommendation
Concerning the Promotion of Employee Participation in Profits and Enterprise
Results (including Equity Participation). 33 This proposal simply requests the
Member States to free up their legal systems to encourage the social partners
(management and unions) to negotiate diverse types of voluntary employee profit
participation schemes (profit-sharing, employee-share-ownership, and stock-
options programs).' 32 Implicitly conceding that, even under European jurispru-
dence, these programs are most properly a product of free enterprise and not
governmental regulation, this proposal avoids any overt mandates and instead
seeks only to encourage employer profit participation schemes chiefly by "en-
hanc[ing] social partners' awareness" of them. 3
I. RIGHT TO HEALTH AND SAFETY PROTECTION IN THE WORKPLACE
Another area in which European worker representatives have long called for
comprehensive EC-level regulation is workplace health and safety, the topic of
the Charter's ninth right. Substantial progress has occurred in this area over the
years, 3' and the Social Action Program aims at even more substantial progress.
Twelve of the Social Action Program's forty-seven proposals involve workplace
health and safety, more proposals than under any other single Charter right. "
The Commission began issuing these specific proposals in 1990, when it put forth
a draft directive on safety at mobile work sites. 136 By their very specificity, these
new topics for safety legislation indicate that existing EC safety regulations cover
substantial ground. Subsequent regulation will only fill in gaps.
J. PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS
The Charter's final three rights grant affirmative protections to three groups:
the young, the old, and the handicapped. 3' The Charter's tenth guarantee, of
protection for the young, largely addresses wage rates and vocational training. 138
Enforcing this, in January 1992 the Commission issued its first post-Maastricht
social document, a long-awaited proposal to regulate the work hours of youth by
131. Id.
132. Id. 1 10.
133. Id. 1 9.
134. The Council has been actively harmonizing EC health and safety laws since 1974. See, e.g.,
Council Decision on the Setting Up of an Advisory Committee on Safety, Hygiene and Health
Protection at Work, Council Decision 74/325, 1974 O.J. (L 185) 15, 16. For citations to the leading
EC instruments of health and safety through 1990, see BYRE, supra note 71, at 405-532; EUROPEAN
INFORMATION SERVICES, supra note 71, at 295-579.
135. Compare Social Action Program, supra note 36, at 45-49 with id. at 9-42, 50-53.
136. Council Directive on the Proposal for the Implementation of Minimum Safety and Health
Requirements at Temporary or Mobile Work Sites, COM(90)257 final SYN 279. See generally R.F.
Eberlie, The New Health and Safety Legislation of the European Community, 19 INDUS. L.J. 81
(1990).
137. Charter, supra note 35, 11 20-26.
138. Id. 11 20-23.
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banning night work for those under eighteen, banning those under fifteen from
all but light work, and banning those under thirteen from all work except entertain-
ment. The proposal also called for a limit on students' work hours.
K. PROTECTION OF THE AGED
The Charter next, as its eleventh right, grants affirmative rights to the aged,
but these rights focus on basic state-provided sustenance, not on employment
restrictions. 139 That the Charter's social protections for the aged appear to focus
on state-run benefit programs is good news for employers of Europeans because
this deflects the concerns that give rise to the employer-restrictive U.S. model of
affirmative antidiscrimination rights for the aged.'4° Apart from pension regula-
tion, ultimately Brussels' chief role regarding protection of older workers may
only be to coordinate propaganda stressing the aged's concerns. To this end the
Social Action Program suggests that 1993 be labeled "a year for the elderly.'-
141
L. PROTECTION OF THE HANDICAPPED
Like its protections for the aged, the Charter's twelfth and final guarantee, of
rights for the handicapped,142 amounts more to a statement of affirmative social
policy than to a body of antidiscrimination prohibitions directly affecting employ-
ment. 143 However, while the Charter and Social Action Program's protections for
the handicapped are essentially toothless from the employment law viewpoint
139. Id. 24-25. European employers-including North American employers operating in Eu-
rope-openly advertise age biases in a way that would be grossly illegal in the United States. E.g.,
THE TIMES (London), May 7, 1992, Life & Times, at 15 (advertisement by Citibank claims bank is
"an equal opportunities employer" but opens "FX sales and trading" positions only to those who
"will graduate this year"); id. (Microsoft seeks Account Manager aged "mid-twenties to thirties");
id. at 26 (Sun Life of Canada seeks representatives "between 24 and 49"); SUNDAY TIMES (London),
Nov. 4, 1990, § 6, at 2 (Coopers & Lybrand Deloitte Executive Recruiting seeks "Sales and Marketing
Director ... [p]robably aged around 35"); id. at 3 (advertisement seeking "Internal Sales Manager
... [a]ged between 23-40"); id. at 10 (advertisement seeking "Director of Legal Services" for MSL
International, aged "early-mid 30's"). Compare Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621-634 (1988) (prohibiting discrimination in employment against anyone over age forty). Some-
day, a U.S. age discrimination plaintiff suing one of the U.S. companies that openly discriminate
abroad on the basis of age (such as Microsoft or Coopers & Lybrand Deloitte) will show a jury the
smoking gun of an openly-age-biased overseas advertisement and argue "institutional bias." After
the jury renders an enormous plaintiffs' verdict, the U.S. company will instruct its foreign subsidiaries
to pull these ads, if only to reduce U.S. liability. In the meantime, creative plaintiffs' lawyers may
realize the utility of reading foreign help-wanted ads. See generally Dowling, supra note 16, at 353,
353 n.21.
140. See, e.g., Charter, supra note 35, 25.
141. Social Action Program, supra note 36, at 52. However, age bias in employment is a wide-
spread social problem in Europe. See, e.g., citations in Dowling, supra note 4, at 613 n.307.
142. Charter, supra note 35, 1 26.
143. By comparison, U.S. law, especially under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1990), actively prohibits discriminating in employment against the
"disabled'--and "disabled" can include alcoholics, former drug addicts, and victims of long-term
diseases, including AIDS.
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(they would not change anything material about EC employment relationships),
Brussels has taken great strides in the handicap area unrelated to employment.'
In 1988 the Council adopted a community action program intended to help inte-
grate the handicapped socially-the HELIOS program-Handicapped People in
the European Community Living Independently in an Open Society.145 In 1991
the Commission proposed expanding the HELIOS program, issuing a Proposal
for a Council Directive Establishing a Third Community Action Program to
Assist Disabled People, HELIOS 11 (1992-96).46 HELIOS II would improve the
computer data bases and other information sources and aids available to the
handicapped. Additionally, the Council has adopted two recommendations re-
garding improving assistance to handicapped children. 147
m. The Future of EC Employment Regulation
From the perspective of the U.S.-based corporation, the future of EC employ-
ment, or social, regulation-that is, the blueprint set out in the Charter, the Social
Action Program, the proposed Maastricht Social Protocol, and the Commission's
1990-91 package of draft instruments-looks expensive. European workers al-
ready receive from their employers some of the highest pay and benefit levels in
the world. Once the Social Action Program's forty-seven called-for instruments
are in place, European workers' pay and benefits, at least on the continent, will
rise even higher.
Nevertheless, the social Europe program sends some positive signals to U.S.-
based employers through what it omits. The Charter and the Social Action Pro-
gram are virtually silent on the employment doctrine that worries U.S. employers
most: antidiscrimination law. 48 With the conspicuous exception of sex discrimi-
nation, the EC's social Europe agenda omits antidiscrimination protections for
racial minorities, religions, and-notwithstanding the Charter rights to protection
for the aged and the handicapped-even the aged and the disabled. Nothing in the
social Europe agenda raises the specter of liability analogous to U.S. law under
144. In 1986 the Council did adopt a recommendation concerning the employment of the handi-
capped. Council Recommendation on the Employment of Disabled People in the Community, 1986
O.J. (L 225) 43, 44.
145. Council Decision 88/231 Establishing a Second Community Action Programme for Disabled
People, 1988 O.J. (L 104) 38.
146. COM(91)350 final.
147. Conclusions of the Council and the Ministers of Education Meeting Within the Council
Concerning a Programme of European Collaboration on the Integration of Handicapped Children into
Ordinary Schools, 1987 O.J. (C 211) 1; Resolution of the Council and the Ministers of Council
Meeting Within the Council Concerning Integration of Children and Young People with Disabilities
into Ordinary Systems of Education, 1990 O.J. (C 162) 2.
148. See generally Social Action Program, supra note 36, at 5 ("the Commission is not making
a proposal in respect of discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, or religion"). Generally, the
social Europe agenda aims at providing positive benefits to workers, while U.S. employment law
imposes negative prohibitions on employers.
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the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 149 the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,50
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 5 ' and analogous state laws, or under the
Employment Retirement Income Security Act. 152
As long as the fate of the Maastricht treaty remains uncertain, whether Brussels
will realize its overall goal of using social legislation to create a fairer, more
cohesive EC-or whether, conversely, comprehensive social regulation will un-
reasonably cripple European business-remains an open question. However, the
snowballing effect of a Brussels-regulated EC social agenda since 1989153 makes
all but inescapable the conclusion that someday the post-1992 EC single market
will have a cohesive set of employment regulations applicable throughout the
Community. However, whether Britain will be exempt from EC social legislation
and will therefore become the "Hong Kong of Europe,' ' 54 or whether EC pro-
worker legislation, even if limited to the continent, will prove unconnected to
macroeconomic success, remains unknown. In the early 1990s Germany had
the strongest economy in Europe, stronger even than that of the deregulated
post-Thatcher Britain. 155 Yet to U.S. employers, Germany, the breeding ground
of worker participation, is notorious as having the most restrictive employment
laws in Europe. Perhaps, to the surprise of U.S. businesses, the EC might just
be able simultaneously to make a success of both its broad employment-law goals
and its free single market.
149. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
150. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1988).
151. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213 (1990).
152. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988). Further, with the conspicuous exception of sex discrimina-
tion, nothing in the social Europe agenda approaches the severity of U.S. protections on the basis of
race, nationality, and religion. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1988).
153. Throughout this period, the EC's commitment to forming a social Europe remained strong
all the way up to the chairmanship of the Council itself. See, e.g., Mr. Jacques Santer, Prime Minister
of the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg, Chairman of the European Council, Address Before the A.B.A.
Committee on International Labor Law (May 2, 1991) (unpublished, available from A.B.A. Commit-
tee on International Labor Relations Law, Labor Law Section) ("For the single market to be completed
and lead one day to the results desired and hoped for, the flanking social policy to such a common
market must achieve genuine progress!") (emphasis in original).
154. See supra note 47.
155. The Council, at Maastricht in December 1991, appointed Germany's Bundesbankto shepherd
the other Member States' central banks toward EC economic and monetary union by 1999.
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